The happy youth of a desperate country: the disconnect between Japan's Malaise and its millennials, by Noritoshi Furuichi (Japan

Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, Japan, 2017) by Tsedendemberel, Otgonbaatar
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 1
THE HAPPY YOUTH OF A DESPERATE COUNTRY: 
THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN JAPAN’S MALAISE 
AND ITS MILLENNIALS, by Noritoshi Furuichi (Japan 
Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, Japan, 2017)  
Otgonbaatar Tsedendemberel1
In this book, with its seemingly self-explanatory title, Noritoshi Furuichi 
argues that, despite Japan’s desperate situation amidst decades-long economic 
recessions, a deteriorating birth rate, an ageing population, the immediate 
aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, and the 
subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the majority of its youth (nearly 
80 percent) seem to be “happy” nonetheless. Noritoshi Furuichi is a young 
Japanese sociologist, a senior researcher at the Keio Research Institute, a Ph.D. 
candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of the University of 
Tokyo, and a dedicated commentator on youth and political issues. Zetsubo ̄ no 
kuni no kōfuku na wakamonotachi (the Japanese title of the book) reports how 
Japanese youth deal with desperation and despair in their own terms based on 
the author’s articulations of youth theory, various interviews with young people, 
an extensive review of government surveys and publications, as well as his own 
observations as a sociologist and a young member of Japanese society. 
The book is unique in the sense that it documents young people’s reactions 
and moods right after the 3/11 natural disaster, reflecting the aspirations and 
frustrations of youth. At the same time, it is a book about youth by a young 
scholar who has thought much about youth theory and youth issues and debates 
with the former through multiple channels, including on Japanese television. 
This book is original and novel because Furuichi critically analyzes what it 
means to be a youth or young in today’s Japan with its challenging political, 
social, economic, and cultural realities. The 2015 paperback edition and the 
much-needed English translation of 2017, comprised of over 280 pages, are 
empirically-informed, scholarly, yet very enjoyable books on youth theory 
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by a youth; Furuichi himself was only twenty-six years old when he released 
the original book in 2011. Writing extensively about topics such as the war 
museums of the world, with an analysis of the intersection between war and 
memory, generation-gap-related issues, and women’s solutions to childcare, 
Furuichi’s other books include Nobody Can Teach War, Kodansha, 2015; That’s 
Why Japan is Off, Shinchosha, 2014; and Making Nursery Schools Compulsory; 
Shogakukan, 2015. 
The title of the book is neither self-explanatory nor misleading, as the author 
challenges and unpacks common assumptions and (mis)perceptions that have 
to do with young people in Japan. Furuichi speculates, contrary to common 
belief, that those who lived and worked hard during the period of high economic 
growth of the 1980s were not necessarily “happy” given the extended working 
hours required from young employees who joined the infamous “rat race” 
characterized by a post-war modern business management model (“the good 
school, the good company, the good life”) and the excessive competition involved 
in entering university of high school pupils, as represented in the so-called 
“exam wars.” Compared with these arguably miserable, “misfortunate” lives 
led by their counterparts of more than 30 years ago, the “happy” youth of today 
enjoy the effects and products of highly developed information and technology, 
benefit from reasonably accessible, available, and affordable services in terms 
of food, shelter, and clothing, participate in neo-liberal capitalist consumerism, 
and are presented with abundant life choices and opportunities. Furutoshi claims 
that young people are “happy” and satisfied with the present because “they do 
not believe that tomorrow will be better than today.”  
Through this book the author attempts to start a dialogue by looking into 
the essence and dynamics of contemporary youth in his society, but, more 
importantly, fills in the gaps in the youth-related arguments and theories 
proffered thus far. In six chapters, the author aptly questions the meaning of 
“young people” as an entity, concluding that the expression is merely an illusion 
based on his conversations and analysis of youth discourse; he also demystifies 
various perceptions and stereotypes surrounding youth through a rigorous 
review of survey data; presents fieldwork findings with a special focus on events 
such as the World Cup and youth participation in protests and demonstrations; 
and discusses generational disparities and problems with labor. Addressing 
the hope and anxiety, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, as well as dreams and 
despairs of youngsters in tough times is not unique to Japan; just as financially 
challenging circumstances gave rise to the phenomenon of “parasite singles” 
in Japan – young people who live with their parents beyond their late twenties 
– equivalent terms emerged in other developed nations, such as twixter in the 
United States, nesthocker in Germany, and mammoni in Italy.   
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Youth theory, or theorization about the young people of Japan (seinen-ron) 
itself, should be a part of the famous Nihonjin-ron arguments (theories and 
discussions about the allegedly common traits of the Japanese), but youth 
discourse is largely absent of this umbrella theory. Or rather, as the author 
suspects, youth discourse merely serves as a means for adults to enrich 
the overall Nihonjin-ron. In this sense, Furuichi establishes that we should 
consider the particular phenomenon not as an issue that concerns individual 
young persons but as one that should be understood together with the realities 
of the existing social structure. This brings the author to iterate the purpose of 
his book: “to structurally portray as social issues the issues of ‘young people,’ 
which are prone to being appropriated – that is to say, co-opted – for personal 
identity purposes and cultural matters.” Having defined the theoretical or 
conceptual frameworks with regard to the “young people” under discussion, 
Furuichi tackles the empirical data in the subsequent chapters and refutes a 
series of myths surrounding young people: they are not necessarily “inward 
looking”; they are not reluctant consumers, but they consume carefully; 
although young people do not show up to cast their votes at the ballot box, they 
are politically active in terms of participating in protests and relief campaigns. 
Methodologically, the author sees the Public Opinion Survey on Social 
Awareness as an excellent source as it has been asking same questions for 
more than thirty years, making it possible for researchers to analyze shifting 
attitudes.
Furuichi tackles youth theory from four major perspectives: “alien others,” 
“expedient allies,” “cultural argument,” and “empirical studies,” in which he 
argues that the older generations’ bashing of young people as “alien others” has 
been ongoing for more than a century, whereas the wartime period saw young 
people prominently being viewed as “expedient allies.” However, modern youth 
discourse started together with the so-called “fantasy of the classless society” 
in which young people were discussed as if they all came from the middle 
class, glossing over their local differences, economic disparities, and gender. 
Therefore, the author focuses his analyses and arguments on young people in 
their twenties who lived in the immediate aftermath of the period of economic 
growth that ended in 1991. With the bursting of the economic bubble, which 
started in the 1970s, “the good school, the good company, the good life” model, 
consequent life-time employment prospects and related guarantees for life 
collapsed at the same time. The lost decades, which stretched from 1991 until 
2011, are well-known as a time of prolonged economic recession(s) in Japan 
which saw the 3/11 earthquake and nuclear disaster at the end. Thus, this is the 
story of how Japanese young people have been dealing with such a desperate 
climate and dark clouds over their heads.  
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Central to the author’s main arguments is his attempt to redefine what it 
means to be young – youth theorization. Whereas the term “wakamono” (young 
people) refers to those in their twenties and thereabouts, “seinen” (youth) means 
the young generation, a term which was commonly used until the 1970s. The 
former replaced the latter due to the undesirable normative nuances expressed 
by the latter. In claiming that “young people are our/nation’s hope” or that 
“young people these days are [such and such] (usually negative adjectives or 
connotations),” adults impose high expectations on youth as a group, or “youth-
bash” or blame them for just being themselves. Young people, while required to 
be patriotic and nationalistic, and often glorified in the media and by an integral 
part of society, are also considered expendable as they were required to sacrifice 
their lives for the country, first during times of war (from the second Sino-
Japanese war to WWII) and then for the so-called economic war. In discourse, 
it appears that life for Japanese youth is often characterized as a “war,” ranging 
from a real war to the “rat race” to achieving well, financially and collectively (an 
“economic war”), and to performing well academically and individually (“exam 
war”), to climbing up the increasingly crucial social, economic, academic, and 
professional ladders. Youth discourses about post-war democracy and post-
WWI liberalism, especially the criticisms expressed by the older generations, 
are painfully similar to how some post-Soviet countries criticize their youth for 
interpreting democracy as “anarchism,” and human rights and gender issues as 
“unacceptable ideologies.”
In other words, from being the “nation’s hope,” “consumer” citizens, warriors 
in all sectors of life, to “outrageous” in the eyes of adults, “capsule beings,” or 
“moratorium beings,” young people as a whole and as a generation are portrayed 
as either “alien others” or “expedient allies.” Youth are seen as a hope and 
“ally” one day and “alien others” the next, being subjected to the mood and 
the sway of adults. Furuichi is overly critical of the dangerously harmful term 
“generationalism,” as it tends to overlook the individualistic and hierarchical 
diversity inherent in a “generation,” and neglects all other signifiers such as 
race, gender, and community. Moreover, there are cultural arguments that 
contribute to the emergence of the siloed, individualized wakamono. Along with 
strong economic growth, the first baby boomers who were born between 1947 
and 1949, and those who have not experienced war, created their own unique 
culture, further complicating the definition of young people as an entity. On 
the other hand, the culture of copycat (replicated) experiences afforded by the 
information society of the mid-1970s made young people “together-separate,” 
united through distant “experiences,” similar to today’s online culture in which 
young people of all societies connected through the internet can have common, 
shared experiences despite space, time, and location. Thus, the concept of 
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wakamono emerged somewhere between the late 1960s and the 1970s to define 
a homogenous group whose attributes other than age did not matter. Therefore, 
the author avoids employing a single, unified definition of “youth,” or “young 
people” in this book, let alone deploying today’s commonly used definitions of 
youth created by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) 
and other similar institutions.
Apart from the signifiers such as race, gender, age, and community, another 
dimension which enriches the arguments in the book is class. The 1960s, along 
with post-war economic growth and media representations of youth, witnessed 
the fantasy that the class system had been abolished altogether, wherein people 
mistakenly thought that Japan had become a classless society, evidenced by 
the “one-million-member-middle-class” myth. In this, age was the only thing 
people focused on, while expressing disillusionment that all young people were 
from the middle-class, whereas in reality disparities still existed. The author 
is understandably and justly skeptical about the notion of “youth as customer” 
and the “ichi-oku sō-churyu” myth (“one-million-member-middle-class” myth) 
which is still relevant and valid today given the recent advent and promotion of 
a minimalist culture among youth, both in developed and developing countries. 
Of relevance to the field of sociology, it is intriguing to discover that in 1953 
the first full-scale sociological study of young people in Japan reviewed the 
then-available research on youth in Europe and America, applying it to concrete 
cases observed in the country. In this study, a group of Japanese sociologists 
discussed seinen as a generation, a diverse entity, through a compilation of 
scholarly essays. Unlike how some contemporary psychologists viewed youth 
as a “biological generation” and thus those of urban and rural environments 
as one and the same, sociologists, focusing on the social relevancy and social 
disparity of youth, decided otherwise. On the other hand, Furuichi confesses 
that his understanding of the modernization of Japan shifted from a “textbook 
understanding” to a better place following the launch of a book by the 85-year-
old sociologist Hidetoshi Kato in 2015, Media no tenkai (“The development of 
media”). Whereas Furuichi had thought the Edo period (1603-1868) was “pre-
modern,” Kato’s claims proved that it was “early modern” in the sense that by 
the mid-eighteenth century changes deemed to be the signs of “modern times” 
were already underway. An example of this is the mass tourism that started at 
that time, refuting some misperceptions that the freedom of movement was then 
altogether prohibited.   
Although Furuichi succeeded in starting and intensifying the debate about 
youth in Japan with his book, he also was able to promote inter-generational 
dialogue among sociologists and social scientists. One of the formidable 
examples of this has been presented above. Throughout the whole book, 
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Furuichi meticulously details the age and hometown of each and every author 
he references, the young people he interviewed, and even foreign authors and 
scholars he quoted both in and off text in brackets. This might validate some 
readers’ prejudices about the thoroughness and meticulousness of the Japanese. 
However, these minor references help readers to follow who proposes or opposes 
which arguments, and where these individuals might have come from in terms 
of age and background. Not that it matters a lot, but it is a helpful tool.  
Furuichi proposes and backs up many fascinating arguments to full satisfaction 
with the relevant empirical data in a true sociological sense. To experience 
this pleasure, readers should choose this book – either the Japanese or English 
edition – in anticipation that the adept, skillful translation does not lack the 
sarcastic and ironic tone and caustic wit of the author in either language. More 
importantly, the book is a living document as the author has been able to update 
the content, to converse with himself and other contributors and scholars, as 
well as his critics, since the first launch and paperback edition of the book. In 
sum, Furuichi, by re-defining and problematizing the notion of youth in today’s 
Japanese society as an illusion but a diverse entity, critically questions how 
young people as a whole can contribute to society by seeking ways to solve some 
of the social, economic and political dilemmas involved with this desperate 
situation. Endorsed by empirical data and sound analyses that are both based on 
research findings and in-depth interviews and observations, the author presents 
possible interpretations of consummatory or self-sufficient young individuals 
who are somewhat satisfied with their way of living, but increasingly anxious 
and adamant about where all this is leading.   
